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Policy debates about ﬁnancial globalisation are closely connected to the investment technology of
foreign investors in emerging markets. On one hand, it is argued that foreign investors bring capital to
good projects. At the same time, there are concerns that foreign investors are afﬂictedwith weaknesses
of information and analysis, which yields problems such as home bias, misallocation of capital, pro-
cyclicality of capital ﬂows, and vulnerability to sudden stops.
The home bias literature has shown that foreign investors often invest in only a small set of ﬁrms in
an emerging market. As an example, while there are over 5000 listed ﬁrms in India, in 2011 there were
only 703 ﬁrms where foreign investors owned above 5 per cent of the publicly traded (i.e. ‘ﬂoating’)
market value. This raises questions about these chosen ﬁrms.What is the process of portfolio formation
adopted by foreign investors? Do foreign investors possess a strong investment technology, through
which their capital is channelled into good projects?CC BY-NC-ND license.
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innovation of this paper lies in disentangling asset allocation and security selection in understanding
the investment technology of foreign investment. The distinction between asset allocation and security
selection has been a central organising principle in the analysis of fund performance from the mid-
1960s. Portfolio returns can be decomposed into exposure to systematic asset pricing factors, such
as size or book-to-market, as opposed to returns from security selection. Differences in asset allocation
reﬂect the portfolio strategy of the investor, and there can be legitimate reasons for differences in
exposures to asset pricing factors. In contrast, performance in security selection unambiguously re-
ﬂects investment technology.
We analyse the behaviour of foreign versus domestic institutional investors in India and ﬁnd
substantial differences in asset allocation. In some respects, foreign investors take on more risk, and
should therefore obtain higher expected returns. In other respects, this operates in reverse; foreign
investors take on reduced risk.
We then turn to the question of security selection. After controlling for differences in
asset allocation, do foreign investors do well in choosing securities? Speciﬁcally, do ﬁrms chosen by
foreign investors exhibit superior stock market returns? We look beyond the emphasis on returns in
the ﬁnance perspective to also examine ﬁrm fundamentals. Do the ﬁrms chosen by foreign investors do
better on growth in output, and growth of productivity?
This analysis of security selection contains a mix of a selection process – do foreign investors forecast
well, andmanage to identify ﬁrms that are going to dowell? – and a treatment effect – does the decision by a
foreign investor to buy shares in a company have a causal impact upon improved ﬁrm performance? We
pursue the reduced form outcome, andmake no attempt to disentangle selection from treatment effects.
We devise a quasi-experimental strategy for measuring the ability of foreign or domestic investors
to do security selection, after controlling for differences in asset allocation. This involves identifying
and addressing numerous threats to validity. Differences between ﬁrms in systematic asset pricing
factors, such as size, B/P and b, are correlated with future outcomes. As an example, high b ﬁrms are
likely to see high output growth in a business cycle expansion. In order to measure security selection,
ﬁrms with high foreign institutional investment (but not domestic institutional investment) are
matched against ﬁrms which got neither. Controls are identiﬁed which have similar size, B/P and b to
the chosen ﬁrms. The comparison of outcomes identiﬁes the security selection process, without being
confounded by differences in asset allocation.
Our results may be summarised as follows. The ﬁrms chosen by foreign investors are those that have
experienced high growth of capital (when compared with the control) prior to the observation date.
They continue to obtain high growth of capital after the observation date. There is some evidence of
superior output growth. However, the chosen ﬁrms have inferior productivity growth, and deliver
weak stock market returns when compared with the controls.
In contrast, the ﬁrms chosen by domestic institutional investors appear to deliver superior returns,
and superior productivity growth, in the years after measurement date. This suggests that domestic
institutions possess a valuable investment technology.
Themethodology and the results of this paper have many implications. The literature on investment
technology of foreign versus domestic investors, which has generally emphasised reduced form port-
folio returns, has inconclusive results. We would emphasise that differences in overall portfolio returns
reﬂect a combination of differences in asset allocation and differences in security selection, which may
explain how different researchers have obtained different results on the superiority of the investment
technology of foreign investors. For foreign investors in India, these results suggest that the returns drag
associated with poor security selection could be avoided by achieving the desired asset allocation
through index funds that express systematic asset pricing factors. Themethodology of this paper can be
easily extended to other countries, since the data requirements are met in all emerging markets.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset used in the
paper. Section 3 sketches the questions and the measurement strategy. Section 4 examines the
asset allocation choices of foreign and domestic institutional investors and ﬁnds substantial differences
between the two. Section 5 measures the security selection process, after controlling for differences in
asset allocation. Section 6 undertakes a series of modiﬁcations to the analysis in order to gauge the
sensitivity of the results. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Table 1
Industry composition.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Chemicals 482 509 551 516 522 506 578 574 578 570 571
Diversiﬁed 33 34 34 31 34 38 40 42 42 42 42
Electricity 11 12 12 13 15 17 17 21 22 23 24
Food 193 211 223 210 210 208 247 252 251 246 252
Machinery 254 273 264 268 267 265 287 288 284 279 283
Metals 179 199 203 202 204 204 244 249 249 241 243
Mining 18 21 22 20 22 23 26 26 28 29 32
MiscManuf 101 108 106 104 102 111 136 137 138 141 139
NonMetalMin 114 127 132 125 124 121 135 135 138 137 142
Serv.Construction 109 116 112 110 116 124 141 160 166 175 191
Serv.IT 155 151 167 153 154 154 182 195 195 200 206
Serv.Other 460 480 479 444 455 475 544 543 529 537 578
Textiles 248 274 285 272 266 264 307 305 298 292 299
TransportEq 90 95 92 90 98 100 113 113 117 117 115
Sum 2447 2610 2682 2558 2589 2610 2997 3040 3035 3029 3117
This table shows the number of ﬁrms in eachmajor industry group, in each year, of the dataset under examination. In addition to
manufacturing ﬁrms, we also observemany services ﬁrms. As an example, there were 155 information technology ﬁrms in 2001,
which went up to 206 in 2011.
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Many papers in this literature have observed the behaviour of individual fund managers. Our work
in this paper utilises standard disclosures at the ﬁrm level. For each ﬁrm, we observe the structure of
shareholding, which includes information about the ownership by domestic institutional investors and
the ownership by foreign institutional investors. Certain ﬁrms have substantial investment by foreign
institutional investors. The paper is an empirical exploration of the question: Do these ﬁrms fare
better?
The dataset for our analysis is drawn from the CMIE Prowess database about ﬁrms in India, from
2001 to 2011. This is a rich database where a wide array of information about large ﬁrms is observed.1
The industry structure of the dataset is shown in Table 1. As this table shows, the ﬁrms in our dataset
are drawn from a diverse array of industries, and include many services ﬁrms also. Table 2 shows
summary statistics about the ﬁrms in the dataset.
One simple measure of productivity is obtained by differentiating the Cobb-Douglas production
function: _w ¼ _y al_l ð1 alÞ _kwhere _w is the productivity growth, y is log output, k is log capital, l is
log wages and al is the share of labour i.e. the ratio of wages to sales.
In the estimation of ﬁrm productivity, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) argued that there is an endo-
geneity problem owing to the correlation between unobservable productivity shocks and the input
levels. They propose using intermediate inputs (rawmaterial expenditure) as a proxy for the purpose of
estimation. We implement their procedure using their Stata code. This cannot be done for services
ﬁrms which do not buy raw materials. Hence, when we analyse productivity using the Levinsohn-
Petrin measure, this is limited to manufacturing ﬁrms.
Most ﬁrms in India have a dominantmanager/shareholder, which is typically a family, which retains
strategic control of the ﬁrm in the long run. In the Indian parlance, this shareholder is termed ‘the
promoter’. As Table 2 shows, the median ﬁrm has promoter ownership of 50.03 per cent, i.e. full
control.
Finally, we turn to describing categories of institutional investors observed in this dataset. Indian
capital controls only permit registered ‘foreign institutional investors’ (FIIs) to invest in the equity
market (Shah and Patnaik, 2007). Once registration is done, the investment process is fairly1 Not all ﬁrms in the CMIE database disclose the number of employees. In this paper, we have used data within a given
industry within a year, to compute the average wage using ﬁrms where the number of employees was observed. This was used
to impute the number of employees for observations where the overall wages was observed but the number of employees was
not observed.
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variable Units Mean SD Min 25th Median 75th Max
Sales Rs. million 7153.61 63,329.24 1.00 141.65 645.50 2655.40 3,574,219.80
Gross Fixed Assets Rs. million 4255.86 36,627.87 1.00 96.90 371.30 1486.70 2,212,519.70
Total Assets Rs. million 7943.24 55,635.54 1.00 180.50 695.00 2892.00 2,849,003.50
Employees Number 1227.04 5,342.23 1.00 35.57 183.07 790.70 159,999.57
Wage bill Rs. million 337.15 2,669.62 0.10 6.50 30.20 130.10 134,173.50
FII ownership Per cent 4.05 10.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.36 89.29
DII ownership Per cent 9.60 15.66 0.00 0.00 1.22 13.48 100.00
Promoter ownership Per cent 49.01 20.01 0.00 35.64 50.03 63.27 99.83
Adjusted Closing Price Rs. 68.85 378.85 0.01 4.00 12.35 45.35 49,088.80
TFP (Levinsohn Petrin) 21.25 8.25 1.00 18.70 20.68 22.49 186.55
Some features of the dataset are shown in the table.
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and insurance companies. We focus on the ownership by FIIs and by DIIs.
Institutional investors can only choose to hold shares which are not held by the dominant share-
holder. Hence, we rescale the observed shareholding by FIIs and DIIs by the total outsider shareholding.
As an example, if the promoter owns 60%, and if FIIs own 20%, then we rescale the FII holding to 50%.
That is, for this ﬁrm, FIIs own half the shares traded in the public market.
The median ﬁrm in the dataset has no foreign institutional investor (FII) shareholding. DII
ownership is more widely prevalent: the 75th percentile of DII ownership stands at 13.48 per cent
while the corresponding value for FII ownership is just 0.36 per cent.
The ﬁrst exploration that we must embark on is to examine the process of security selection of FIIs
and DIIs. If, hypothetically, we ﬁnd that FIIs and DIIs behave similarly, then there is no need for further
exploration. As an example, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) ﬁnd that in Sweden, while there are
differences between foreign investment and domestic investment, these derive primarily through the
fact that most foreign investment is institutional. When foreign institutional investors are compared
against Swedish institutional investors, their preferences for ﬁrms are largely alike.
In our data, in contrast, there are striking differences between FIIs and DIIs along certain dimensions
of ﬁrm characteristics. Table 3 shows that DIIs have a much bigger shareholding in top quintile com-
panies by asset tangibility, while no strong pattern is visible with FIIs. Similarly, Table 4 shows that DIIs
appear to have a lower shareholding for ﬁrms with bottom quintile values for insider shareholding.
This suggests that FIIs and DIIs differ strongly in their choices of ﬁrms.
In order to explore these relationships, we wish to estimate linear models explaining FII and DII
ownership in terms of ﬁrm characteristics. The estimation results cannot be taken too seriously as there
is no causal interpretation. However, this analysis is a valuable part of data description. Many ﬁrms
have zero values for either FII or DII or both. Hence, we resort toTobit models. Clustered standard errors
are reported to reﬂect the fact that a given ﬁrm can often be observed in many years. Summary sta-
tistics about some ﬁrm characteristics of interest are shown in Table 5.
The results of this estimation are shown in Table 6. In the case of FIIs, we ﬁnd strong results where
FIIs favour ﬁrms with reduced shareholding by insiders, bigger size, a high domestic beta, a high beta
against a global index, low total risk and lower age. They avoid public sector corporations. They favourTable 3
Institutional ownership by asset tangibility.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Tangibility 14.05 34.74 51.10 69.32 96.02
FII 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.89
DII 0.76 0.27 1.39 2.92 20.33
This table breaks down the dataset into quintiles by asset tangibility, deﬁned as the fraction of total assets which are tangible
assets. In the bottom quintile, this has a median value of 14.05%, while in the top quintile, this has a median value of 96.02%.
In each quintile, we report the median value of FII and DII ownership. The median DII ownership is much higher (20.33%) in the
top quintile.
Table 4
Institutional ownership by insider holding.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
Insider holding 25.57 40.99 50.96 59.99 73.46
FII 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
DII 0.74 3.53 4.24 3.55 2.60
This table breaks down the dataset into quintiles by insider shareholding. Bottom quintile companies, by insider shareholding,
have a median insider shareholding of 25.57%. Top quintile companies, by insider shareholding, have a median insider share-
holding of 73.46%.
In all quintiles, the median value of FII ownership is 0. In the case of DIIs, the median value is lower for Q1 when compared with
the other quintiles, i.e. DIIs appear to shun companies where a dominant shareholder has a relatively small shareholding.
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and three dummy variables are constructed. Of these, ‘None’ is the omitted category. FIIs appear to
weakly favour ﬁrms with high R&D expenses.
The results for DIIs are strikingly different. While FIIs avoid ﬁrms with a high inside shareholding,
this does not inﬂuence DIIs. The coefﬁcient for size is much weaker: DIIs invest in smaller ﬁrms than
FIIs. DIIs load up more on illiquid stocks while FIIs do not care about it. While FIIs favour domestic b
exposure, DIIs are not inﬂuenced by it, or by the global b. While FIIs avoid total risk, DIIs are not
concerned about it.
Like FIIs, DIIs are not inﬂuenced by the exports/sales ratio. They strongly favour older companies, in
contrast to FIIs who favour young companies. DIIs own much more public sector companies, while FIIs
systematically avoid them. DIIs strongly favour ﬁrms with more tangible assets, while FIIs favour ﬁrms
with reduced tangible assets. Finally, DIIs invest more in low R&D companies and avoid ﬁrms that
spend more on R&D.
If we believe that dynamic companies are young, private, with low tangible assets, and high R&D,
then it appears that FIIs systematically favour these ﬁrmswhile DIIs shun them.While itmay be obvious
that young or private or high R&D companies are good, theymay not achieve high stockmarket returns
or growth in the future. The information processing capabilities of an investor must be evaluated by
examining the performance of ﬁrms in the period after investment date. The investment technology of
an institutional investor can be evaluated in twoways: by comparing stockmarket returns in the future,
and also by comparing the economic performance of ﬁrms in the future. However, in undertaking these
comparisons, we have to be conscious of differences in asset allocation and control for these.
3. Questions and methodology
The presence of home bias is a well established fact in the international ﬁnance literature: foreign
investors hold relatively lowweights in emerging markets. They tend to invest in large and liquid ﬁrms
with international visibility and better corporate governance.
One strand of this literature has asked the question: Do foreign investors perform well? The
presence of home bias, which suggests limitations in the information processing of foreign investors,Table 5
Firm characteristics that may inﬂuence FII and DII ownership.
Variable Mean SD Min 25th Median 75th Max IQR Observations
Yield 1.92 3.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.68 16.73 2.68 25,402
Global beta 0.64 0.66 6.47 0.29 0.63 0.95 7.61 0.67 15,250
Total risk 0.85 0.47 0.26 0.56 0.72 0.96 2.86 0.40 20,251
Export-Sales ratio 15.97 26.50 0.00 0.00 1.68 19.38 100.00 19.38 28,155
Age 25.95 18.03 1.00 15.00 20.00 30.00 148.00 15.00 30,773
Tangibility 63.13 43.77 1.27 32.38 56.69 84.51 244.94 52.12 29,101
R and D intensity 0.23 0.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.77 0.00 28,243
This table shows summary statistics about ﬁrm characteristics that may inﬂuence FII and DII ownership. Yield is the dividend
yield expressed in per cent. Total risk is the standard deviation of daily returns. Age is measured in years. Asset tangibility is the
tangible assets expressed as per cent of total assets. R&D intensity is the expense on R&D expressed as per cent of sales. Global
beta is estimated using S&P 500. IQR stands for the interquartile range.
Table 6
Tobit models that explain FII and DII ownership.
FII t DII t
Insider holding 0.13 7.16 0.02 1.74
Log mktcap 7.14 30.01 3.88 22.05
Turnover ratio 0.39 1.14 1.36 5.48
Yield 0.29 3.25 0.09 1.36
Domestic beta 3.39 4.61 0.49 0.97
Global beta 0.74 1.77 0.17 0.51
Total risk 4.92 2.80 0.43 0.35
Export to sales 0.01 1.11 0.01 0.81
Age 0.11 5.72 0.16 9.39
Is public sector 6.00 2.76 10.32 4.52
Tangibility 0.03 2.94 0.08 9.06
Low R and D 0.33 0.59 1.74 3.43
High R and D 0.99 1.64 1.55 2.66
Wewish to explore the relationships between FII and DII ownership, and ﬁrm characteristics. Many ﬁrms have zero values for FII
or DII investment (or both). Hence, we estimate two (separate) Tobit models. Correlations within ﬁrm are addressed by clustered
standard errors. Macroeconomic effects are controlled by having year ﬁxed effects.
The table shows estimation results for a tobit model explaining FII ownership and another tobit model explaining DII ownership.
Both models use the identical set of explanatory variables.
As an example, the coefﬁcient of insider shareholding is0.13 (with a t statistic of7.16) for the FII tobit, while it is0.02 (with
a t statistic of 1.74) for the DII tobit.
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foreign investors has difﬁculties, this could encourage investment in index funds that give exposure to
emerging markets without engaging in security selection.
These questions are important to the policy debates about ﬁnancial globalisation (Patnaik and Shah,
2012). If foreign investors suffer from asymmetric information and thus possess an inferior investment
technology, their decisions could induce misallocation. Some of the pathologies identiﬁed by the in-
ternational ﬁnance literature, such as the pro-cyclical behaviour of foreign investment or the phe-
nomena of sudden stops and capital ﬂow reversals, could be attributed to poor information processing
by foreign investors.
This motivates a careful examination of the investment technology of foreign investors. The existing
literature does not have a single unifying model and methodology; a series of papers have obtained
diverse datasets, and each has fashioned a methodology suited to the dataset at hand. Dvorák (2005)
utilises transaction data from the Jakarta Stock Exchange, and ﬁnds that clients of local brokerage ﬁrms
dowell in the short run, but clients of foreign brokerage ﬁrms do better in the long run. Choe et al. (2005)
ﬁnd that foreign investors suffer higher transactions costs in Korea. Froot and Ramadorai (2008) harness a
unique identiﬁcation opportunity by juxtaposing closed-end country fundNAV returns and home country
returns. They argue that institutional cross-border ﬂows are based on sound informationprocessing about
country fundamentals. Albuquerque et al. (2009) argue that the returns-chasing behaviour of US investors
can be attributed to superior information, not inferior knowledge or trend-following.
The mainstream ﬁnance literature on these questions has focused on investment technology in the
sense of returns forecasting. We broaden the analysis to also evaluate forecasts of ﬁrm fundamentals. A
recent paper which has embarked on similar questions with the same dataset is Petkova (2012). As the
home bias literature has demonstrated, foreign investors invest in only a small set of ﬁrms in an
emerging markets. How well does this selectivity process work? Do the ﬁrms chosen by foreign in-
vestors do well in terms of growth of output and productivity?
While these questions are interesting and important, the analysis faces numerous threats to validity
which need to be factored in while constructing a measurement strategy.3.1. Differences in asset allocation
The ﬁrst challenge is that of distinguishing information processing about securities as opposed to
portfolio formation strategies. If foreign and domestic institutional investors have divergent portfolio
strategies, in the sense of exposures to systematic asset pricing factors, this fact will in itself induce
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as investment in high beta, low size, and high B/P ﬁrms, will obtain superior expected returns. This
difference in returns should be interpreted as returns to asset allocation, and not related to information
processing or forecasting about emerging market ﬁrms.
Indeed, given that asset allocation is often largely determined by the investment mandate, to a
substantial extent, differences in asset allocation between foreign and domestic investors should not
be attributed to differences in the investment technology of foreign or domestic investors. As an
example, the investment mandate or chosen portfolio strategy of a foreign investor may require
investment in ﬁrms with a market capitalisation of above $1 billion. The security selection by this
investor must then be judged by comparisons against similar sized ﬁrms that were not chosen for
investment.
These issues arise when evaluating other measures of ﬁrm performance also. High beta ﬁrms would
tend to obtain high growth in a business cycle expansion. This would make it appear that an investor
with a high beta asset allocation possesses skills in security selection during a business cycle expansion.
Before skills in security selection can be assessed, we have to control for differences in asset allocation.
Our ﬁrst objective is thus to measure the asset allocation of domestic versus foreign investors. The
empirical asset pricing literature suggests that the Fama-French factors – size, B/P, and b – explain the
bulk of the variation in portfolio performance. In our sensitivity analyses, we will also explore liquidity
and momentum as potentially important asset pricing factors.3.2. Differences in security selection
Our analysis of asset allocation (in Section 4) shows that foreign and domestic investors differ in
their choices on size, B/P and b.2 Traditional regression analysis would attempt to control for these
differences by running regressions where size, B/P and b are present as controls. However, such
analysis suffers from two key problems: (a) The true relationship is likely to be nonlinear, resulting in
misspeciﬁcation of conventional linear models and (b) When there is a lack of match balance, con-
ventional linear models involve extrapolation, which is fraught with estimation risk.
Hence, we embark on a matching process, where each ﬁrm that was chosen by FIIs, but not
DIIs (or by DIIs, but not FIIs) is matched against a partner that got neither FII nor DII invest-
ment, where the chosen ﬁrm and the partner have similar values for size, B/P and b. If a high
quality match is not obtained, the ﬁrm is deleted from the dataset. This ensures a high quality
design which gives us the ability to focus on security selection without being confounded by
differences in asset allocation.
The questions of interest involve a complex interplay between selectivity effects and treatment ef-
fects. Foreign investment is not a treatment in the sense of the literature on treatment effects. When a
foreign investor buys shares on the secondary market, in some respects, the ﬁrm is unaffected. Further,
foreign investors canﬂit in and out of ownership of the company. From this viewpoint, the phenomenon
of interest is selection: Do foreign investors farewell in forecasting future stockmarket returns and thus
pick winners? Do the ﬁrms that they choose experience high growth in output and productivity?
If the question under analysis were purely about treatment effects, then propensity score matching
would have been appropriate. However, to the extent that the mechanism of selection is the phe-
nomenon of interest, propensity score matching is inappropriate.32 Before we examine the security selection of foreign investors, two possibilities need to be ruled out. One possibility involves
foreign investors investing primarily in index funds. In this case, their returns would reﬂect exposure to systematic asset pricing
factors and the returns to security selection would be zero. Another possibility involves foreign and domestic investors
choosing alike. In this case, there would be no discernable difference between the security selection of foreign versus domestic
investors. Our preliminary analysis in Section 2 has ruled out both these possibilities.
3 As an example, consider a ﬁrm characteristic X (e.g. export intensity) that is used by FIIs in identifying ﬁrms to invest in. If X
is present in the logit model used for propensity score matching, then the matched control will have similar values for X.
However, this may obscure the phenomenon of interest. Focusing on high export companies may be a valuable part of the
investment technology. If FIIs select ﬁrms for investment using export intensity, and if this yields high quality investments, this
phenomenon would not be captured by a comparison of treatment and control through propensity score matching.
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ﬁrm. Foreign investors might get involved in corporate governance and thus improve the functioning of
the ﬁrm. In a model of imperfect capital market integration such as Merton (1987), the entry of foreign
investors into a ﬁrmmay be associated with enhanced stock prices, andmay enable improved access to
equity and debt ﬁnancing which may fuel growth of capital. If ﬁrms are ﬁnancially constrained, this
might make it possible for them to take up good quality projects and thus obtain sharp improvements
in output and productivity.
In this paper, we recognise that both selection and treatment effects are present, and make no
attempt to disentangle them. We focus on the reduced form question: Regardless of whether this is
owing to selection or treatment effects, do the ﬁrms chosen for investment by foreign investment fare
well in the future, in terms of growth in output, productivity and stock market returns?
3.3. The problems of comparing institutional investors against domestic individual investors
Most foreign investment in emerging markets is done by institutional investors, while most
domestic investors in emerging markets are individuals. An extensive literature in ﬁnancial
intermediation has emphasised the unique decision problems of institutional investors. A more
recent household ﬁnance literature has identiﬁed unique features of the behaviour of individual
investors.
In order to avoid comparisons between foreign institutional investors against domestic individual
investors, we compare the behaviour of foreign institutional investors (FII) against domestic institu-
tional investors (DII).
3.4. Identifying FII vs. DII
The simplest estimation strategy would involve running regressions explaining an outcome (e.g.
output growth) from time t to time t þ k on ownership structure at time t. This would suffer from the
problem that many ﬁrms have both domestic and foreign institutional investment. The phenomena of
interest are not identiﬁed for these ﬁrms.
Hence, we devise a quasi-experimental strategy by identifying two groups of ﬁrms: Thosewith high
FII investment but not DII investment, and vice versa. The former set is the ﬁrms chosen by FIIs for
investment but shunned byDIIs, and the latter is the ﬁrms chosen byDIIs for investment by shunned by
FIIs. The comparison of performance by these ﬁrms would highlight the differences in information
processing (and potential treatment effects) by FIIs vs. DIIs.
3.5. Summary of methodology for measuring security selection
In summary, our strategy for measuring capabilities in security selection, after controlling for dif-
ferences in asset allocation, works in three steps:
1. At each year, identify a ‘High FII’ set of ﬁrms, with high FII investment but lowDII investment, and a
‘High DII’ set of ﬁrms, with high DII investment but low FII investment. A third set of ﬁrms of
interest is ‘None’, where there is neither FII nor DII investment. Drop ﬁrms that have high FII and
high DII investment.
2. For each ﬁrm in the High FII or High DII sets, identify a matched control from the set ’None’
that has similar size, B/P and b. Reject chosen ﬁrms where a high quality match cannot be
obtained.
3. This leaves us holding a dataset containing N ﬁrms with high FII investment (but not DII invest-
ment) and another N ﬁrms with neither FII investment nor DII investment, where the two sets are
matched by size, B/P and b. Observations across many years are pooled. This permits regressions of
the form yi,tþk yi,t¼ a0þ a1Dþ ei,twhere the growth in y is explained using the dummy variableD
which denotes high FII investment. Clustered and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are
reported.
Table 7
Summary statistics about asset pricing characteristics.
Variable Mean SD Min 25th Median 75th Max IQR Observations
Domestic beta 0.82 0.50 2.50 0.54 0.80 1.07 5.31 0.53 15,882
Log book-to-price 0.11 1.19 7.06 0.66 0.14 0.89 4.61 1.55 22,989
Size 5.82 2.41 1.14 4.00 5.55 7.35 15.07 3.35 25,402
Log momentum 1.59 0.09 0.12 1.56 1.61 1.62 2.43 0.06 28,523
Turnover ratio 0.22 0.56 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.16 3.97 0.15 24,916
This table shows summary statistics about ﬁrm characteristics of interest. As an example, log market capitalisation ranged from
1.14 to 15.07 with a median value of 5.55.
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The empirical asset pricing literature has emphasised three factors: size (market capitalisation),
book-to-price and b (Fama and French, 1993). The expected returns of a portfolio tend to be higher
when it tilts towards high b, low size and high book-to-price ﬁrms. Summary statistics for these ﬁrm
characteristics are shown in Table 7.4
Table 8 repeats the Tobit analysis of Table 6, where the explanatory variables are quartile dummies
for the size, B/P, and b. The results differ strongly, which suggests that FIIs and DIIs differ strongly in
their exposure to empirical asset pricing factors.
We then compute the asset pricing characteristics of the representative FII and the representative
DII as a weighted average of ﬁrm characteristics.5 These calculations are made for each year, and the
median across all years is shown in Table 9. This shows substantial differences across the
asset allocation of these two investors. As an example, the weighted average value of log B/P for the
representative FII, 1.37, differs substantially from the value of 0.8 for the representative DII.
Fig. 1 shows values for each year. Table 9 shows the median values across the time-series that are
reported in Fig. 1. Apart from two years (2002 and 2006), the beta of the FII portfolio is always higher.
FIIs have invested in larger ﬁrms through all years other than the recent three years. FIIs have had a
lower value of B/P in all years other than the recent four years.
This analysis demonstrates that there are systematic differences in the asset allocation of FIIs and DIIs:
Beta Higher beta is likely to be associatedwith greater expected returns, andwe ﬁnd that FIIs take
on higher beta exposure: in the univariate analysis of Table 9, after controlling for other asset
pricing factors in the tobit model in Table 8 and after controlling for other ﬁrm observables in
the tobit model in Table 6. This is consistent with rational portfolio formation under
segmented markets, where domestic investors are averse to non-diversiﬁable risk while
foreign investors see a signiﬁcant part of domestic beta risk as being diversiﬁable.
Size The home bias literature has generally found that foreign investors favour large ﬁrms, and
our results strongly agree with this in Table 9 (univariate analysis), Table 8 (tobit with asset
pricing factors) and Table 6 (tobit with other observables). However, smaller ﬁrms are likely
to be associated with greater expected returns. Here, it is the DIIs that take on the risk of
owning smaller ﬁrms and presumably obtain superior expected returns as a consequence.
Liquidity Liquidity is expected to be associated with a liquidity premium. In an international context,
an argument could be made that domestic investors supply liquidity while foreign in-
vestors demand it (Campbell et al., 2009). Our results in Table 6 show that after controlling
for other observables, it is the DIIs that are holding more illiquid stocks, after controlling for
size. This issue is addressed in more detail in Section 6.3.1 ahead.4 We estimate the stock b for all ﬁrms using weekly returns data for the latest two years.
5 As an example, consider a two-ﬁrm world, where the FII ownership in the two ﬁrms is w1 and w2, if the market capital-
isation is m1 and m2, and the ﬁrm betas are b1 and b2. The weight of each ﬁrm in the portfolio of the representative FII is
x1 ¼ w1m1/(w1m1 þ w2m2). The portfolio beta of the representative FII is x1b1 þ x2b2.
Table 8
Tobit model based on empirical asset pricing characteristics.
FII t DII t
Intercept 8.75 16.81 5.41 19.81
Small size 30.49 24.35 20.10 25.95
Med size 6.92 9.44 4.71 9.32
Large size 1.38 2.78 1.50 3.99
Low book-to-price 1.56 2.47 5.56 9.14
Med book-to-price 4.99 10.23 2.74 6.52
High book-to-price 0.42 1.14 0.03 0.10
Low beta 4.63 7.51 0.15 0.33
Med beta 0.85 1.80 0.10 0.27
High beta 0.01 0.02 0.47 1.51
This table shows Tobit models explaining FII and DII ownership based on empirical asset pricing factors. For each of the three
factors – size, B/P and b – we construct four quartile dummies. Year ﬁxed effects are present. In each case, the bottom quartile is
the excluded dummy variable. The results show that FIIs and DIIs differ strongly in their asset pricing exposures. As an example,
FIIs load strongly on Low beta (which stands for second quartile by beta), with a coefﬁcient ofþ4.63 with a t statistic of 7.51. DIIs,
in comparison, are largely indifferent to the domestic beta.
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stocks. Strong differences in value investing are also seen in Tables 8 and 9, which suggests
that DIIs should earn higher expected returns through exposure to the HML factor.
There is no simple mapping from these differences in asset allocation to their implications for
expected return. For the purpose of the present analysis, we do not pursue the impact of these
divergent choices in asset allocation upon expected returns. It sufﬁces to demonstrate that FIIs and DIIs
are dissimilar in their asset allocation. This shapes our analysis of security selection.
5. The security selection of FIIs and DIIs
Wewould like to judge the investment technology of FIIs and DIIs by evaluating the performance of
ﬁrms in the future, after the date onwhich the shareholding pattern is observed. At the same time, we
would like to control for differences in exposures to empirical asset pricing factors. This would help us
assess the security selection by FIIs and DIIs, without being confounded by differences in
asset allocation, i.e. systematic asset pricing factors.
In each year, we assign a ﬁrm to the following groups based on the median ownership of ﬁrms by
FIIs and DIIs, in the class of ﬁrms for which non-zero investment was present. These median values
prove to be 5 per cent for FIIs and 6 per cent for DIIs.
We deﬁne a ‘High FII’ group as one where FII ownership was above median, but DII ownership was
belowmedian. These are the ﬁrms favoured by FIIs but disfavoured by DIIs. Similarly, we deﬁne a ‘High
DII’ group where DII ownership was above median, but FII ownership was below median. Finally, a
control pool termed ‘None’ is constructed of ﬁrmswhere FII ownership was below its median value and
DII ownership was below its median value. Wewould like to compare the future performance of a High
FII company against a similar company from ‘None’, and the future performance of a High DII company
against a similar company from ‘None’.Table 9
Median exposure to asset pricing factors.
Beta Size Log book-to-price
FII 0.93 11.05 1.37
DII 0.73 9.17 0.80
Difference 0.20 1.88 0.58
We report median values across the years of the characteristics of the representative FII and the representative DII portfolio. As
an example, the representative FII has ﬁrms with size 11.05, which is larger than the corresponding value of 9.17 for the ﬁrms in
the portfolio of the representative DII.
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Fig. 1. Exposure to asset pricing factors. We examine the FII and DII exposure to systematic asset pricing factors in this ﬁgure. The
exposure is calculated as the weighted sum of the asset pricing factor, where the weight is equal to the funds allocated to a security
as a percentage of the portfolio.
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‘None’) in each year. In 2011, there were 483 ‘High DII’ ﬁrms and 274 ‘High FII’ ﬁrms. There were a large
number of ﬁrms in ‘None’, which is our control pool. A key insight of our quasi-experimental strategy lies
in not utilising information for ﬁrms that lie in the set ‘Both’, as the effects of interest are not identiﬁed.
Table 11 shows transition probabilities on a one year horizon across these four categories. We
observe that DII investment is sticky, but FIIs change portfolio frequently. There is a strong possibility of
dropping back to ‘None’ in year tþ 1 after being in either ‘High DII’ or ‘High FII’ category at time t. Once
a ﬁrm is in ‘High FII’ category, there is an 18.46% chance that it will drop into ‘None’ in the next year, but
there is a 12.33% chance that it will go up to ‘Both’ in the next year by gaining high DII investment also.
At the simplest, an OLS model explaining an outcome of interest yit (such as stock market returns or
sales growth or productivity) could have a conventional linear control for size, B/P and b:
yi;tþj  yi;tk ¼ b0 þ b1sizei;t þ b2book=pricei;t þ b3betai;t þ g0Di;t þ eit
In this regression, we are interested in the coefﬁcients g aboutmembership in the group ‘High FII’ or
‘High DII’ in year t  1. Differences between ﬁrms in size, B/P and b. would be controlled for. We utilise
Table 10
Number of ﬁrms in each category.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Both 181 141 134 185 241 375 442 495 416 421 428
High DII 927 980 962 807 708 598 635 572 593 539 483
High FII 35 41 38 63 97 141 207 246 262 236 274
None 1319 1466 1560 1508 1547 1496 1719 1732 1769 1838 1937
Sum 2462 2628 2694 2563 2593 2610 3003 3045 3040 3034 3122
The table shows the number of ﬁrms in each year, which fall into the four categories ‘Both’ (investment by both FIIs and DIIs that
is above-median), ‘High DII’ (above-median investment by DIIs but below-median investment by FIIs), ‘High FII’ (above-median
investment by FIIs but below-median investment by DIIs) and ‘None’ (below-median investment by both FIIs and DIIs).
Table 11
Transition probabilities across the four groups of ﬁrms.
Both High DII High FII None
Both 80.50 10.68 6.81 2.00
High DII 5.86 82.54 0.91 10.69
High FII 12.33 1.72 67.49 18.46
None 0.63 2.13 2.26 94.98
Each row of this table shows probabilities for where a ﬁrmwould be in year tþ 1 given that it is in a certain category in year t. As
an example, a ﬁrmwhich is classiﬁed as ‘None’ at time twould stay in that state in year tþ 1with a probability of 94.98%. There is
a 2.26% per cent chance that it would jump up to ‘High FII’ and a 2.13% chance that it would jump up to ‘High DII’. For a ﬁrm that
is in ‘High FII’ in time t, there is a 18.46% chance of it falling back to ‘None’ at time t þ 1.
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growth of an outcome variable y from year t  k to year t þ j.
This traditional regression strategy suffers from certain weaknesses (Stuart, 2010). The impact of
size, B/P and b upon y might not be linear. When the design matrix involves some ﬁrms in ‘None’ and
some ﬁrms in ‘High FII’, and their characteristics differ, the OLS regression relies upon linear extrap-
olation to overcome these differences. This extrapolation is fraught with difﬁculties. A design matrix
constructed with all observations may be a poor path to sound estimates of g.
In order to address these problems, we propose a matching-based strategy. For each ﬁrm in the
‘High FII’ or ‘High DII’ categories, we use Mahalanobis distance matching in order to ﬁnd a matched
partner from the ‘None’ category, aiming to match on size, B/P and b.6 For each of these categories, this
would yield a balanced design. A caliper is used to delete observations where the match quality is poor.
Matched pairs from all years are pooled to construct the dataset where OLS estimation is done:
yi;tþj  yi;tk ¼ b0 þ gDi;t þ ei;t
This utilises information about the investment characteristics at time t in order to make statements
about the growth of an outcome variable y from year tk to year t þ j.
The design here is a series of matched pairs. For the ﬁrm with ‘High FII’, we have D ¼ 1, while its
matched partner (which has neither high FII nor high DII investment), D ¼ 0. The coefﬁcient g thus
reports on the extent to which selection by FIIs at time t impacts upon the outcome y.
It is also interesting to look backwards into time. The left hand side variable yi,t can pertain to
conditions that prevailed before date t. In this case, the results of the regression give us insights into the
process of selectivity by FIIs or DIIs. At the same time, the results obtained here would differ from the
previous tobit regressions, since the design matrix here is a more carefully constructed one.
Table 12 shows the results of this matching process for ﬁrms with high FII investment. As an
example, in 2002, there were 41 ﬁrms with high FII investment but low DII investment, and 1466 ﬁrms
with low FII investment and low DII investment. However, Mahalanobis distance matching based on
size, B/P and b yielded only 14 matches. Overall, we see that a fairly large dataset of matched pairs is
assembled using this process.
The same strategy, applied to high DII investment ﬁrms (with low FII investment) yields matched
pairs as shown in Table 13. Here, a much larger number of matched pairs is obtained.
5.1. Match balance
The ﬁrst question that has to be addressed is about the extent to which this quasi-experimental
strategy achieves match balance.6 Mahalanobis distance matching in a vector of characteristics x is most appropriate when x is multivariate normal. While the
joint distribution of size, B/P and b is not exactly multivariate normal, the four marginal distributions (of size, log book-to-
market and b) are approximately normally distributed. While this departure from normality is a blemish, the entire match-
ing scheme is a means to an end: that of achieving match balance in x. As we show in this paper, our matching scheme
(Mahalanobis distance matching with a calipers) succeeds in the sense of achieving high quality match balance.
Table 12
Number of matched pairs for high FII.
Low FII, low DII High FII, low DII Matched pairs
2002 1466 41 14
2003 1560 38 10
2004 1508 63 34
2005 1547 97 63
2006 1496 141 59
2007 1719 207 91
2008 1732 246 127
2009 1769 262 182
2010 1838 236 179
2011 1937 274 199
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low DII investment). The matching process has worked well; the standardised differences have
dropped to near zero. This is reinforced by Kolmogorov–Smirnoff tests shown in Table 15. The null of
equality of distributions is always rejected in the raw data and is never rejected after matching.
A similar analysis for the ﬁrms with high DII investment (but low FII investment) is shown in Tables
16 and 17. In the raw data, there are serious problems of match balance, but after matching, the
standardised differences are near zero, and the null in the K–S test is not rejected.
For both kinds of institutional investors, this analysis persuades us that the matching process has
resulted in a sound design. That is, wewill be comparing a ﬁrm chosen by an FII or a DII against one that
was not chosen by either, while ensuring that there are no systematic differences in size, B/P and b. This
ensures that we are focused on the security analysis by FIIs and DIIs, without being clouded by their
asset allocation strategies. The fact that the raw data has poormatch balance in both cases (High FII and
High DII), and that match balance is only achieved after matching, is a reminder that we should be
skeptical about the usefulness of conventional econometrics when applied to the raw data.5.2. Firms that got high FII but low DII investment
We now analyse the future outcomes for ﬁrms that got high FII investment, but low DII investment.
These results are shown in Table 18. While conventional OLS results with all data are also shown, we
focus on the quasi-experimental design obtained through matching.
The ﬁrst outcome variable that we analyse is log gross ﬁxed assets. When we look back in time, we
see that the ﬁrms where D ¼ 1, i.e. the ﬁrms with high FII investment (but not high DII investment) got
faster growth in ﬁxed assets in the one and two years prior to observation date. In other words, FIIs
appear to be choosing ﬁrms which have experienced high growth in ﬁxed assets. Looking into the
future, the ﬁrms chosen by FIIs had a change in log ﬁxed assets that was larger than the control by 0.06
on a horizon of one year, 0.14 on a horizon of two years and 0.23 on a horizon of three years. All these
differences are strongly statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that the ﬁrms chosen by FIIs increased
their ﬁxed assets strongly in the period following selection by FIIs. This could either reﬂect selectivityTable 13
Number of matched pairs for high DII.
Low FII, low DII High DII, low FII Matched pairs
2002 1466 980 407
2003 1560 962 322
2004 1508 807 236
2005 1547 709 208
2006 1496 598 204
2007 1719 635 220
2008 1732 572 219
2009 1769 593 286
2010 1838 539 266
2011 1937 483 244
Table 14
Standardised difference for FII.
Before matching After matching
Size 1.46 0.05
Book-to-Price 0.75 0.02
Beta 0.30 0.05
Table 15
Kolmogorov Smirnov test for FII. P-values are reported in the brackets.
Before matching After matching
Size 0.5716 (0) 0.048 (0.2194)
Book-to-price 0.3061 (0) 0.0303 (0.7724)
Beta 0.1905 (0) 0.0438 (0.316)
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(the purchase of shares on the secondary market by FIIs impacted upon the growth of the ﬁrm).
Similar results are obtained for log total assets. FIIs choseﬁrmswhere the balance sheet grew faster in
the preceding one and two years. After the measurement date, the ﬁrms chosen by FIIs had a change in
log total assets that was larger than the control by 0.05 on a horizon of one year, 0.1 on a horizon of two
years and 0.15 on a horizon of three years. All these differences were strongly statistically signiﬁcant.
Turning to employment growth, the ﬁrms chosen by FIIs had weakly superior employment growth
in the years prior to measurement date. After the measurement date, their employment growth was
only slightly greater than the control. The ﬁrms chosen by FIIs thus appear to have pursued capital-
intensive growth strategies in the years after measurement date.
Despite strong increases in capital, and slight increases in employment, on a horizon of one and two
years after measurement date, output growth by selected ﬁrms was not signiﬁcantly greater than the
control. On a three year horizon, there is evidence of improved output when comparedwith the control.
The simple productivity measure as described above yields negative estimates which are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. For manufacturing ﬁrms, we are able to compare TFP using Levinsohn-Petrin es-
timates. On a one year horizon, there is some evidence of inferior TFP growth by theﬁrms chosen by FIIs.
Finally, we look at stock market returns. Firms chosen by FIIs show inferior returns without strong
statistical signiﬁcance.
To summarise, these results suggest that the ﬁrms chosen by FIIs are on a trajectory of capital
deepening. In the period after measurement date, there is strong growth of capital when compared
with the control, which could reﬂect a combination of forecasts of high growth by the FII, or a causal
effect of the purchase of shares by FIIs.
The remaining efftects are lukewarm. Firms chosen by FIIs have positive estimates of employment
growth, but this is not statistically signiﬁcant. Output growth for the chosen ﬁrms is better, and on a
three year horizon this difference is statistically signiﬁcant. Firms chosen by FIIs seem to get higher
output growth on a three year horizon through a strongly capital-intensive strategy. There is some
evidence of inferior productivity growth. In terms of stock market returns, FIIs do worse, though the
results are not statistically signiﬁcant.
5.3. Firms that got high DII but low FII investment
We now turn to the ﬁrms chosen by DIIs but not FIIs, where results are in Table 19. In the years prior
to the measurement date, the ﬁrms selected by DIIs had lower growth in ﬁxed assets and in total assets.Table 16
Standardised difference for DII.
Before matching After matching
Size 0.50 0.03
Book-to-price 0.07 0.00
Beta 0.13 0.01
Table 17
Kolmogorov Smirnov test for DII. P-values are reported in the brackets.
Before matching After matching
Size 0.2342 (0) 0.0337 (0.1031)
Book-to-price 0.0513 (0) 0.0191 (0.7249)
Beta 0.0973 (0) 0.0257 (0.3566)
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from the control.
With employment and output, there is no difference between the ﬁrms chosen by DIIs and the
controls, in the period before or after the measurement date.
When we examine the simple measure of productivity growth on a three year horizon, the ﬁrms
chosen by DIIs outperform the controls by a factor of 0.08, which is statistically signiﬁcant at a 95 per
cent level. However, this result is not present when using the Levinsohn-Petrin measure of TFP (which
applies for manufacturing ﬁrms only).
The most interesting results are found with stockmarket returns. On horizons of one, two and three
years, the ﬁrms chosen by DIIs outperform the controls. The superior returns are economicallyTable 18
Outcomes for ﬁrms chosen by FIIs but not DIIs.
Log gross ﬁxed assets Log total assets
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.08 (0.033)* 0.11 (0.036)** Xt  Xt2 0.15 (0.036)*** 0.1 (0.027)***
Xt  Xt1 0.04 (0.02)* 0.06 (0.021)** Xt  Xt1 0.1 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.014)***
Xtþ1  Xt 0.06 (0.021)** 0.06 (0.018)** Xtþ1  Xt 0.08 (0.019)*** 0.05 (0.014)**
Xtþ2  Xt 0.08 (0.033)* 0.14 (0.039)*** Xtþ2  Xt 0.11 (0.031)*** 0.1 (0.029)**
Xtþ3  Xt 0.12 (0.044)** 0.23 (0.057)*** Xtþ3  Xt 0.13 (0.043)** 0.15 (0.047)**
Log employment Log sales
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.17 (0.044)*** 0.1 (0.038)* Xt  Xt2 0.04 (0.033) 0.03 (0.042)
Xt  Xt1 0.11 (0.025)*** 0.05 (0.022)* Xt  Xt1 0.03 (0.018). 0.02 (0.024)
Xtþ1  Xt 0.02 (0.024) 0.03 (0.022) Xtþ1  Xt 0.06 (0.021)** 0.03 (0.025)
Xtþ2  Xt 0.07 (0.047) 0.07 (0.044) Xtþ2  Xt 0.11 (0.041)** 0.04 (0.046)
Xtþ3  Xt 0.07 (0.067) 0.11 (0.069) Xtþ3  Xt 0.2 (0.064)** 0.16 (0.07)*
Cobb Douglas productivity growth TFP (Log LP estimate)
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.05 (0.033) 0.06 (0.027)* Xt  Xt2 0.01 (0.016) 0 (0.01)
Xt  Xt1 0.09 (0.056) 0.11 (0.045)* Xt  Xt1 0 (0.008) 0 (0.006)
Xtþ1  Xt 0.01 (0.028) 0.03 (0.03) Xtþ1  Xt 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.007)
Xtþ2  Xt 0.05 (0.049) 0.09 (0.055) Xtþ2  Xt 0.01 (0.012) 0.01 (0.012)
Xtþ3  Xt 0.07 (0.069) 0.05 (0.075) Xtþ3  Xt 0.01 (0.013) 0 (0.016)
Log adjusted closing price
OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.21 (0.092)* 0.05 (0.057)
Xt  Xt1 0.19 (0.06)** 0.01 (0.035)
Xtþ1  Xt 0.01 (0.07) 0.04 (0.038)
Xtþ2  Xt 0.08 (0.106) 0.11 (0.069)
Xtþ3  Xt 0.09 (0.128) 0.12 (0.103)
The dataset is a series of matched pairs, where D ¼ 1 is a ﬁrm with high FII investment (but low DII investment), and D ¼ 0 is a
matched partner which got neither FII nor DII investment. Matching has been done on size, B/P and b, and there is high quality
match balance. OLS estimates for yi,t ¼ b0þgDi,t–j þ ei,t are estimated for various outcomes of interest y, for values of j, and the
estimated bg is reported in each case. Clustered robust standard errors are reported. While the main focus is on the matching-
based estimates, conventional OLS estimates using unﬁltered data are also reported.
As an example, consider an outcome of interest: log total assets. Thematching based estimate shows that the ﬁrms chosen by FIIs
have a change in log total assets over a three year horizon that is larger than that observed for controls by 0.15, with a standard
error of 0.047.
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cent on a two year horizon (with a standard error of 3.8 percentage points) and 18 per cent on a three
year horizon (with a standard error of 5.7 percentage points).
The ﬁrms chosen by DIIs yield superior stock market returns when compared with controls, while
the ﬁrms chosen by FIIs do not. This suggests that DIIs possess a valuable investment technology while
FIIs do not. While the ﬁrms that FIIs invest in experience exuberant growth, there are concerns about
productivity, and superior stock market returns are not obtained. In contrast, DIIs appear to get
involved in ﬁrms that are not on a high growth trajectory. However, there is some evidence of gains in
productivity and strong evidence about superior stock market returns.
6. Sensitivity analyses
We assess the robustness of these results by undertaking three alternative estimations.
1. Size weights
2. More extreme deﬁnitions of FII and DII
3. Alternative choices of asset pricing factorsTable 19
Outcomes for ﬁrms chosen by DIIs but not FIIs.
Log gross ﬁxed assets Log total assets
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.1 (0.02)*** 0.05 (0.02)* Xt  Xt2 0.1 (0.018)*** 0.06 (0.015)***
Xt  Xt1 0.05 (0.011)*** 0.02 (0.01) Xt  Xt1 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.008)
Xtþ1  Xt 0.03 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.012) Xtþ1  Xt 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.009)
Xtþ2  Xt 0.05 (0.02)** 0.02 (0.023) Xtþ2  Xt 0.02 (0.018) 0.02 (0.017)
Xtþ3  Xt 0.05 (0.031) 0.04 (0.033) Xtþ3Xt 0.01 (0.026) 0.02 (0.025)
Log employment Log sales
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.06 (0.024)** 0.02 (0.021) Xt  Xt2 0.05 (0.021)* 0 (0.025)
Xt  Xt1 0.03 (0.013)* 0 (0.013) Xt  Xt1 0.02 (0.012) 0.01 (0.015)
Xtþ1  Xt 0.03 (0.015) 0.01 (0.013) Xtþ1  Xt 0.01 (0.015) 0 (0.017)
Xtþ2  Xt 0.03 (0.026) 0.02 (0.024) Xtþ2  Xt 0.03 (0.028) 0.01 (0.032)
Xtþ3  Xt 0.01 (0.036) 0.04 (0.035) Xtþ3  Xt 0.05 (0.04) 0.06 (0.044)
Cobb Douglas productivity growth TFP (Log LP estimate)
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.02 (0.018) 0.02 (0.016) Xt  Xt2 0 (0.007) 0 (0.006)
Xt  Xt1 0.05 (0.03) 0.04 (0.026) Xt  Xt1 0 (0.005) 0 (0.004)
Xtþ1  Xt 0.03 (0.018) 0 (0.017) Xtþ1  Xt 0.01 (0.005) 0 (0.004)
Xtþ2  Xt 0.09 (0.031)** 0.03 (0.031) Xtþ2  Xt 0.02 (0.006)* 0.01 (0.006)
Xtþ3  Xt 0.13 (0.043)** 0.08 (0.042)* Xtþ3  Xt 0.01 (0.008) 0.01 (0.01)
Log adjusted closing price
OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.05 (0.052) 0.03 (0.035)
Xt  Xt1 0.06 (0.03) 0.04 (0.021)
Xtþ1  Xt 0.17 (0.034)*** 0.07 (0.023)**
Xtþ2  Xt 0.25 (0.053)*** 0.12 (0.038)**
Xtþ3  Xt 0.26 (0.066)*** 0.18 (0.057)**
The dataset is a series of matched pairs, where D ¼ 1 is a ﬁrm with high DII investment (but low FII investment), and D ¼ 0 is a
matched partner which got neither FII nor DII investment. Matching has been done on size, B/P and b, and there is high quality
match balance. OLS estimates for yi,t ¼ b0 þ gDi,t–j þ ei,t are estimated for various outcomes of interest y, for values of j, and the
estimated g
ˆ
is reported in each case. Clustered robust standard errors are reported. While the main focus is on the matching-
based estimates, conventional OLS estimates using unﬁltered data are also reported.
As an example, consider an outcome of interest: log total assets. The matching based estimate shows that the ﬁrms chosen by
DIIs have a change in log total assets two years prior to measurement date that is larger than that observed for controls by0.06,
with a standard error of 0.015.
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Themain results shown in the paper treated all ﬁrms as equal. This may give undue importance to a
large number of small ﬁrms. Hence, we undertake the same analysis with size weights. Size is deﬁned
as the average of ﬁrm sales and ﬁrm total assets.
The results for ﬁrms with high FII investment (but not high DII investment) are presented in Table
22 in the appendix. As with the main results, ﬁrms chosen by FIIs (but not DIIs) experience rapid
growth of capital, prior to the measurement year and after it. While there is improvement in
employment growth on a horizon of one year, this does not take place over two and three year hori-
zons. However, this is associated with inferior productivity growth. The coefﬁcients at all horizons are
negative but not statistically signiﬁcant. There is no evidence of superior stock market returns.
Size-weighted results for ﬁrms with high DII investment (but not high FII investment) are presented
in Table 23 in the appendix. These are also qualitatively similar to the main results. These ﬁrms have
experienced declining total assets for the years prior to measurement date and both one and three
years after measurement date. Employment and output growth appear to be no different from the
control prior to measurement date, though they are signiﬁcantly lesser than the control ﬁrm over a
horizon of two and three years. However, there is strong evidence of superior productivity growth.
There is also strong evidence of superior stock market returns by 15% on a one year horizon and 21% on
a two year horizon. This suggests that DIIs have an impressive investment technology while FIIs do not.6.2. More extreme deﬁnitions for FII and DII dummies
Themain results of the paper were based onmedian values for FII and DII investment of ﬁve and six
per cent respectively. That is, a “High FII investment” ﬁrm was deﬁned as one with more than 5%
ownership of non-promoter shares by FIIs.
We redo the calculations using a more extreme deﬁnition. We deﬁne a High FII group as one where
FII ownership was above 12.5% (i.e. 66th percentile of the distribution of FII investment), and DII
ownership was below 1.35% (i.e. 33rd percentile of the distribution of DII investment). Similarly, we
deﬁne a High DII group where DII ownership was above 18.6%, but FII ownership was below 3.23%. The
control group is constructed of ﬁrms where neither FII nor DII ownership was above their 33rd
percentile values.
Table 24, in the appendix, shows the results for ﬁrms with high FII investment (but low DII in-
vestment). These results are qualitatively similar to the main ﬁndings of the paper. The ﬁrms chosen by
FIIs have experienced strong growth in capital prior to measurement date, and also see strong capital
growth after measurement date. Employment growth is also superior, as is sales growth.
However, the productivity measures show that the chosen ﬁrms have inferior productivity
growth when compared with the controls. The stock market returns obtained by these ﬁrms is
sharply inferior to that obtained by the controls over horizons of one, two and three years. The
magnitudes involved are large: stock returns are inferior by 29% on a two year horizon and 38% on a
three year horizon.
Turning to the ﬁrms chosen for high investment by DIIs (but not FIIs), the results (Table 25 in the
appendix) show that DIIs choose ﬁrms where total assets have declined over the recent two years.
Employment growth is reduced over the horizons of three years. Output growth is no different from
the controls. The stock market returns are strongly superior: a superiority of 14% on a two year horizon
and a superiority of 24% on a two year horizon.6.3. Alternative choices of asset pricing factors
The main results of the paper were based onmatching the securities selected by FIIs and DIIs on the
basis of the three asset pricing factors: Size, B/P, and b. Below, we redo the calculations by matching
ﬁrms on two additional variables: Liquidity of the stock measured by the turnover ratio, and mo-
mentummeasured as the six month return of the stock. Turnover ratio is the latest 12 month turnover
expressed as a ratio of market capitalisation.
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Fig. 2. Exposure to Turnover Ratio and Momentum. This ﬁgure shows the FII and DII exposure in terms of turnover ratio and
momentum. The calculation is done as described in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 2 and Table 20 show that FIIs invest in more liquid stocks as compared to DIIs. The median FII
exposure is greater by 1.06 points than the median DII exposure, further highlighting the difference in
asset allocation by these two types of investors.
To incorporate liquidity in the analysis, the matching is done on four parameters – size, beta, book-
to-market and liquidity. Table 26 in the appendix, shows the results for ﬁrms with high FII investment
(but low DII investment). The ﬁrms chosen by FIIs have experienced strong growth in capital prior to
measurement date, and also see strong capital growth after measurement date. Employment growth is
not signiﬁcantly different from the controls, but output growth over a horizon of three years is higher
than the controls. However, the simple measure of productivity shows that the chosen ﬁrms have
inferior productivity growth when compared with the controls prior to measurement date. The stock
market returns obtained by these ﬁrms is lesser than that obtained by the controls but are not sta-
tistically signiﬁcant.
Table 27 in the appendix, shows the results for ﬁrms with high DII investment and low FII in-
vestment. DIIs choose ﬁrms where total assets have declined over the recent two years. Employment
growth and output growth are no different from the controls. However, both the measures of pro-
ductivity show that the ﬁrms chosen by DIIs have superior productivity growth over a horizon of three
years. The stock market returns of ﬁrms chosen by DIIs are sharply superior to that obtained by the
controls over a horizon of one, two and three years. Thus the results with controlling for liquidity are
qualitatively similar to the main results of the paper.
6.3.2. Momentum
Momentum is an important idea in the asset pricing literature (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993; Desai
et al., 2002). As Fig. 2 shows, there is no important difference between FIIs and DIIs on the momentum
factor. The median difference in exposure is only 0.07 as shown in Table 20. Hence, the analysis ofTable 20
Median exposure to turnover ratio and momentum.
Log momentum Log turnover ratio
FII 1.50 1.63
DII 1.56 2.70
Difference 0.07 1.06
Table 21
Summary of results.
Baseline Size wts Extreme defn With liq.
FII DII FII DII FII DII FII DII
Fixed assets 0.23*** 0.04 0.16* 0.12* 0.27** 0.08 0.17** 0.02
Employment 0.11 0.04 0.01 0.1 0.03 0.1* 0.06 0.04
Sales 0.16* 0.06 0.24** 0.15 0.02 0.01 0.12 0.04
CD prod. 0.05 0.08* 0.1 0.24** 0.22 0.04 0.05 0.07
LP prod. 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.06** 0.01 0.01 0 0.02*
Price 0.12 0.18** 0.11 0.24 0.38** 0.24** 0.1 0.18**
This table summarises the results of the paper. In all cases, coefﬁcient estimates on a predictive horizon of three years are re-
ported. Baseline refers to the main results reported in the paper. ‘Size wts’ weights observations by size. ‘Extreme defn’ uses
more extreme cutoffs for deﬁning the ‘High FII’ and ‘High DII’ sets. ‘With liq.’ refers to results based on matching on four factors
where the fourth factor is the turnover ratio.
In all cases, six coefﬁcients are reported: log gross ﬁxed assets, log employment, log sales, Cobb-Douglas productivity, Lev-
insohn–Petrin productivity and adjusted closing price (in logs).
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be no different from the analysis with the three Fama-French factors as shown in Section 5.
7. Conclusions
This paper brings a fresh perspective in understanding the role of foreign and domestic institutional
investors. The striking feature in the data is the fact that large numbers of ﬁrms obtain neither FII nor
DII investment. There are strong differences between the characteristics of ﬁrms chosen by FIIs as
opposed to the ﬁrms chosen by DIIs.
This encourages the question: Do FIIs and DIIs do well in choosing certain ﬁrms for investment?
How do the chosen ﬁrms perform in the future, in terms of stock market returns, and also in terms of
economic outcomes such as growth in output and productivity? A quasi-experimental opportunity to
identify the differences between FIIs and DIIs is created by identifying ﬁrms which have high FII in-
vestment (but low DII investment) and vice versa. If either FIIs or DIIs have skills in identifying ﬁrms
that will do well, or if their decision to invest in a ﬁrm has a causal impact upon the future trajectory of
the ﬁrm, then the chosen ﬁrms will fare well in the future.
We emphasise the distinction between asset allocation and security selection. There are systematic
differences between FIIs, DIIs and controls in the size, B/P and b. These differences in asset allocation
need tobe controlled for so as to focuson the investment technologyof security selection.As anexample,
if FIIs systematically invest inhighbetaﬁrms, andhighbetaﬁrmsdowell in a business cycle expansion, it
will appear that FIIs have the ability to pick winners under buoyant business cycle conditions.
We propose a matching-based strategy in order to address this problem. Each ﬁrm that is chosen by
FIIs (but not DIIs) is matched to a control (that was chosen by neither FII nor DII) based on size, B/P and
b. The comparison of future outcomes, between the ﬁrm that was chosen and the control, identiﬁes the
skill in security selection.
Table 21 summarises the results across alternative designs. In all cases, the coefﬁcients reported
pertain to a three year predictive horizon.
Firms that are chosen by FIIs experience strong growth of gross ﬁxed assets. In contrast, ﬁrms
chosen by DIIs experience either zero or somewhat negative growth of assets. The growth of
employment seems to be zero with the ﬁrms chosen by FIIs and is slighly negative with the ﬁrms
chosen by DIIs. The ﬁrms chosen by FIIs have some output growth while the ﬁrms chosen by DIIs have
low or zero output growth.
Across the two productivity measures, the ﬁrms chosen by FIIs appear to have zero or negative
productivity growth while the ﬁrms chosen by DIIs have positive productivity growth.
In terms of stock market returns, ﬁrms chosen by FIIs experience somewhat negative performance
while the ﬁrms chosen by DIIs do very well.
If large corporations in India were ﬁnancially constrained, then ﬁrms with institutional investment
would be expected to have sharp growth of assets, and to be able to deploy capital into high quality
I. Patnaik, A. Shah / Journal of International Money and Finance 39 (2013) 65–8884projects. However, the results show that ﬁrms chosen by DIIs do not increase capital, and while ﬁrms
chosen by FIIs do experience capital growth, this may go with reduced productivity. The results are,
thus, not consistent with the notion that large corporations in India have high quality projects but
suffer from ﬁnancing constraints.
The contribution of this paper lies in two respects. First, these results illuminate the role of foreign
and domestic institutional investors in one large emergingmarket, India. Second, many elements of the
measurement strategy used in this paper are applicable more generally. The distinction between
asset allocation and security selection, and the quasi-experimental measurement strategy based on
matching on size, B/P and b, could be applied in numerous other settings. Extending the strategy of this
paper to databases in other emergingmarketswould constitute one interesting area for future research.
Our results raise difﬁcult questions. If FIIs do not possess a superior investment technology, would
they be better off with investment strategies such as investing in index funds or in sub-contracting their
investment process to DIIs? This raises questions about the incentives and contracts in ﬁnancial
intermediation that leads to foreign investment, which could be usefully explored in future research.Acknowledgments
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AppendixTable 22
Outcomes for ﬁrms chosen by FIIs but not DIIs: size weighted.
Log gross ﬁxed assets Log total assets
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.28 (0.169) 0.2 (0.05)*** Xt  Xt2 0.3 (0.074)*** 0.15 (0.031)***
Xt  Xt1 0.2 (0.149) 0.12 (0.03)*** Xt  Xt1 0.14 (0.046)** 0.07 (0.017)***
Xt+1  Xt 0.15 (0.089) 0.09 (0.031)** Xt+1  Xt 0.1 (0.031)** 0.07 (0.016)***
Xt+2  Xt 0.06 (0.121) 0.16 (0.046)*** Xt+2  Xt 0.14 (0.051)** 0.11 (0.043)**
Xt+3  Xt 0.06 (0.173) 0.16 (0.066)* Xt+3  Xt 0.17 (0.066)** 0.13 (0.066)*
Log employment Log sales
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.22 (0.116) 0.37 (0.199) Xt  Xt2 0.16 (0.099) 0.08 (0.047)
Xt  Xt1 0.12 (0.039)** 0.25 (0.154) Xt  Xt1 0.11 (0.109) 0.01 (0.044)
Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.028) 0.07 (0.023)** Xt+1  Xt 0.05 (0.054) 0.06 (0.026)*
Xt+2  Xt 0.01 (0.063) 0.04 (0.059) Xt+2  Xt 0.01 (0.054) 0.13 (0.055)*
Xt+3  Xt 0.03 (0.077) 0.01 (0.084) Xt+3  Xt 0.04 (0.109) 0.24 (0.075)**
Cobb Douglas productivity growth TFP (Log LP estimate)
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.09 (0.037)* 0.11 (0.063) Xt  Xt2 0.01 (0.019) 0.02 (0.022)
Xt  Xt1 0.2 (0.08)* 0.14 (0.083) Xt  Xt1 0.01 (0.014) 0.02 (0.017)
Xt+1  Xt 0.02 (0.034) 0.05 (0.038) Xt+1  Xt 0 (0.013) 0.02 (0.015)
Xt+2  Xt 0.02 (0.074) 0.03 (0.078) Xt+2  Xt 0.01 (0.015) 0.02 (0.025)
Xt+3  Xt 0.08 (0.099) 0.1 (0.121) Xt+3  Xt 0.02 (0.022) 0.01 (0.028)
Log adjusted closing price
OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.45 (0.133)*** 0.15 (0.108)
Xt  Xt1 0.26 (0.099)** 0.04 (0.051)
Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.109) 0.01 (0.059)
Xt+2  Xt 0.07 (0.24) 0.05 (0.115)
Xt+3  Xt 0.21 (0.301) 0.11 (0.166)
Table 24
Outcomes for ﬁrms chosen by FIIs but not DIIs: More extreme deﬁnitions of FII and DII ownership.
Log gross ﬁxed assets Log total assets
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.06 (0.04) 0.1 (0.054) Xt  Xt2 0.17 (0.049)*** 0.11 (0.04)**
Xt  Xt1 0.04 (0.025) 0.05 (0.029) Xt  Xt1 0.11 (0.031)*** 0.06 (0.021)**
Xt+1  Xt 0.05 (0.032) 0.11 (0.035)** Xt+1  Xt 0.08 (0.026)** 0.07 (0.022)**
Xt+2  Xt 0.08 (0.048) 0.17 (0.067)* Xt+2  Xt 0.1 (0.04)* 0.11 (0.043)**
Xt+3  Xt 0.13 (0.06)* 0.27 (0.096)** Xt+3  Xt 0.1 (0.052) 0.13 (0.063)*
Log employment Log sales
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.13 (0.057)* 0.06 (0.058) Xt  Xt2 0.07 (0.043) 0.09 (0.059)
Xt  Xt1 0.12 (0.034)*** 0.04 (0.033) Xt  Xt1 0.05 (0.025). 0.04 (0.031)
Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.032) 0.02 (0.033) Xt+1  Xt 0.06 (0.028)* 0 (0.039)
Xt+2  Xt 0.07 (0.06) 0.04 (0.066) Xt+2  Xt 0.14 (0.052)** 0.01 (0.068)
Xt+3  Xt 0.1 (0.085) 0.03 (0.092) Xt+3  Xt 0.16 (0.08)* 0.02 (0.097)
Cobb Douglas productivity growth TFP (Log LP estimate)
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.1 (0.05) 0.04 (0.034) Xt  Xt2 0.02 (0.027) 0.02 (0.017)
Xt  Xt1 0.18 (0.089)* 0.06 (0.065) Xt  Xt1 0.01 (0.014) 0.01 (0.009)
Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.039) 0.11 (0.05)* Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.014) 0.01 (0.009)
(continued on next page)
Table 23
Outcomes for ﬁrms chosen by DIIs but not FIIs: size weighted.
Log gross ﬁxed assets Log total assets
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.05 (0.04) 0.24 (0.169) Xt  Xt2 0.03 (0.045) 0.07 (0.024)**
Xt  Xt1 0.03 (0.022) 0 (0.017) Xt  Xt1 0.01 (0.028) 0.04 (0.015)**
Xt+1  Xt 0.04 (0.023) 0.01 (0.015) Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.023) 0.04 (0.017)*
Xt+2  Xt 0.17 (0.098) 0.05 (0.037) Xt+2  Xt 0.04 (0.035) 0.06 (0.032)
Xt+3  Xt 0.21 (0.15) 0.12 (0.059)* Xt+3  Xt 0.04 (0.048) 0.1 (0.049)*
Log employment Log sales
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.01 (0.058) 0.13 (0.134) Xt  Xt2 0.24 (0.148) 0.3 (0.252)
Xt  Xt1 0.01 (0.019) 0.14 (0.109) Xt  Xt1 0.01 (0.018) 0.01 (0.023)
Xt+1  Xt 0.03 (0.025) 0.12 (0.123) Xt+1  Xt 0.02 (0.024) 0.01 (0.017)
Xt+2  Xt 0.07 (0.042) 0.07 (0.035) Xt+2  Xt 0 (0.075) 0.09 (0.051)
Xt+3  Xt 0.06 (0.057) 0.1 (0.051) Xt+3  Xt 0.08 (0.143) 0.15 (0.078)
Cobb Douglas productivity growth TFP (Log LP estimate)
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.09 (0.037)* 0.11 (0.063). Xt  Xt2 0.01 (0.012) 0 (0.009)
Xt  Xt1 0.2 (0.08)* 0.14 (0.083). Xt  Xt1 0.01 (0.008) 0 (0.006)
Xt+1  Xt 0.02 (0.034) 0.05 (0.038) Xt+1  Xt 0.02 (0.011)* 0 (0.009)
Xt+2  Xt 0.02 (0.074) 0.03 (0.078) Xt+2  Xt 0.04 (0.013)** 0.03 (0.014)*
Xt+3  Xt 0.08 (0.099) 0.1 (0.121) Xt+3  Xt 0.04 (0.013)** 0.06 (0.02)**
Log adjusted closing price
OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.17 (0.082)* 0.07 (0.049)
Xt  Xt1 0.12 (0.056)* 0.02 (0.046)
Xt+1  Xt 0.16 (0.075)* 0.15 (0.043)***
Xt+2  Xt 0.3 (0.121)* 0.21 (0.081)**
Xt+3  Xt 0.28 (0.166) 0.24 (0.129)
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Table 25
Outcomes for ﬁrms chosen by DIIs but not FIIs: More extreme deﬁnitions of FII and DII ownership.
Log gross ﬁxed assets Log total assets
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.14 (0.029)*** 0.07 (0.033)* Xt  Xt2 0.15 (0.023)*** 0.08 (0.022)***
Xt  Xt1 0.07 (0.016)*** 0.02 (0.018) Xt  Xt1 0.06 (0.013)*** 0.03 (0.012)*
Xt+1  Xt 0.04 (0.015)* 0.02 (0.017) Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.014) 0.01 (0.012)
Xt+2  Xt 0.06 (0.027)* 0.05 (0.032) Xt+2  Xt 0.01 (0.026) 0.04 (0.023)
Xt+3  Xt 0.06 (0.04) 0.08 (0.045) Xt+3  Xt 0 (0.037) 0.04 (0.036)
Log employment Log sales
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.1 (0.031)** 0.05 (0.031) Xt  Xt2 0.06 (0.028)* 0.01 (0.036)
Xt  Xt1 0.04 (0.018)* 0.02 (0.019) Xt  Xt1 0.03 (0.019) 0.02 (0.02)
Xt+1  Xt 0.05 (0.022)* 0.01 (0.021) Xt+1  Xt 0 (0.023) 0 (0.027)
Xt+2  Xt 0.06 (0.033). 0.06 (0.036) Xt+2  Xt 0.06 (0.039) 0 (0.042)
Xt+3  Xt 0.03 (0.043) 0.1 (0.048)* Xt+3  Xt 0.08 (0.048) 0.01 (0.052)
Cobb Douglas productivity growth TFP (Log LP estimate)
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.04 (0.025) 0 (0.023) Xt  Xt2 0 (0.01) 0.01 (0.009)
Xt  Xt1 0.08 (0.045) 0.05 (0.039) Xt  Xt1 0 (0.008) 0 (0.006)
Xt+1  Xt 0.03 (0.025) 0.01 (0.027) Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.007) 0.01 (0.007)
Xt+2  Xt 0.11 (0.04)** 0.02 (0.044) Xt+2  Xt 0.02 (0.009)** 0.01 (0.01)
Xt+3  Xt 0.14 (0.055)* 0.04 (0.051) Xt+3  Xt 0.03 (0.01)* 0.01 (0.015)
Log adjusted closing price
OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.1 (0.07) 0.01 (0.054)
Xt  Xt1 0.12 (0.041)** 0.04 (0.032)
Xt+1  Xt 0.25 (0.05)*** 0.06 (0.035)
Xt+2  Xt 0.36 (0.077)*** 0.14 (0.058)*
Xt+3  Xt 0.33 (0.093)*** 0.24 (0.082)**
Table 24 (continued )
Cobb Douglas productivity growth TFP (Log LP estimate)
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt+2  Xt 0.06 (0.068) 0.15 (0.089). Xt+2  Xt 0 (0.022) 0.01 (0.017)
Xt+3  Xt 0 (0.101) 0.22 (0.114). Xt+3  Xt 0.01 (0.022) 0.01 (0.024)
Log adjusted closing price
OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.19 (0.121) 0.09 (0.078)
Xt  Xt1 0.23 (0.078)** 0.02 (0.048)
Xt+1  Xt 0.05 (0.088) 0.1 (0.057)
Xt+2  Xt 0.14 (0.122) 0.29 (0.099)**
Xt+3  Xt 0.25 (0.145) 0.38 (0.144)**
Table 26
Outcomes for ﬁrms chosen by FIIs but not DIIs: Using turnover ratio for matching,
Log gross ﬁxed assets Log total assets
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.08 (0.033)* 0.1 (0.033)** Xt  Xt2 0.15 (0.035)*** 0.08 (0.028)**
Xt  Xt1 0.04 (0.02)* 0.06 (0.017)** Xt  Xt1 0.1 (0.02)*** 0.04 (0.015)**
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Table 27
Outcomes for ﬁrms chosen by DIIs but not FIIs: Using Turnover ratio for matching,
Log gross ﬁxed assets Log total assets
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.1 (0.02)*** 0.04 (0.019). XtXt2 0.09 (0.018)*** 0.06 (0.015)***
Xt  Xt1 0.05 (0.011)*** 0.02 (0.011) Xt  Xt1 0.04 (0.01)*** 0.02 (0.008)*
Xt+1  Xt 0.02 (0.01)* 0 (0.012) Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.009)
Xt+2  Xt 0.05 (0.02)* 0.01 (0.022) Xt+2  Xt 0.02 (0.018) 0.01 (0.017)
Xt+3  Xt 0.05 (0.03) 0.02 (0.032) Xt+3  Xt 0.01 (0.026) 0.02 (0.025)
Log employment Log sales
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.06 (0.024)* 0.01 (0.021) Xt  Xt2 0.05 (0.021)* 0 (0.028)
Xt  Xt1 0.03 (0.013)* 0.02 (0.013) Xt  Xt1 0.02 (0.012) 0.01 (0.016)
Xt+1  Xt 0.03 (0.015) 0.01 (0.013) Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.015) 0.01 (0.017)
Xt+2  Xt 0.03 (0.026) 0.02 (0.024) Xt+2  Xt 0.03 (0.027) 0.01 (0.031)
Xt+3  Xt 0.01 (0.036) 0.04 (0.034) Xt+3  Xt 0.05 (0.039) 0.04 (0.042)
Cobb Douglas productivity growth TFP (Log LP estimate)
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.02 (0.019) 0.02 (0.016) Xt  Xt2 0 (0.007) 0 (0.006)
Xt  Xt1 0.04 (0.031) 0.03 (0.028) Xt  Xt1 0 (0.005) 0 (0.003)
(continued on next page)
Table 26 (continued )
Log gross ﬁxed assets Log total assets
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt+1  Xt 0.06 (0.021)** 0.05 (0.018)** Xt+1  Xt 0.08 (0.019)*** 0.05 (0.015)**
Xt+2  Xt 0.08 (0.033)* 0.08 (0.037)* Xt+2  Xt 0.11 (0.031)*** 0.07 (0.03)*
Xt+3  Xt 0.12 (0.044)** 0.17 (0.059)** Xt+3  Xt 0.13 (0.043)** 0.13 (0.048)**
Log Employment Log Sales
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.17 (0.044)*** 0.05 (0.034) Xt  Xt2 0.03 (0.033) 0 (0.037)
Xt  Xt1 0.1 (0.025)*** 0.03 (0.02) Xt  Xt1 0.04 (0.018) 0.01 (0.021)
Xt+1  Xt 0.02 (0.024) 0.02 (0.023) Xt+1  Xt 0.06 (0.021)** 0.03 (0.025)
Xt+2  Xt 0.07 (0.046) 0.02 (0.045) Xt+2  Xt 0.11 (0.041)** 0.04 (0.047)
Xt+3  Xt 0.07 (0.067) 0.06 (0.065) Xt+3  Xt 0.2 (0.064)** 0.12 (0.072)
Cobb Douglas Productivity Growth TFP (Log LP estimate)
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.05 (0.033) 0.06 (0.023)* Xt  Xt2 0.21 (0.092)* 0.07 (0.055)
XtXt1 0.09 (0.057) 0.1 (0.042)* Xt  Xt1 0.19 (0.059)** 0.03 (0.036)
Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.028) 0.02 (0.029) Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.07) 0.05 (0.039)
Xt+2  Xt 0.05 (0.049) 0.03 (0.051) Xt+2  Xt 0.08 (0.102) 0.08 (0.068)
Xt+3  Xt 0.07 (0.069) 0.05 (0.076) Xt+3  Xt 0.09 (0.124) 0.1 (0.104)
Log adjusted closing price
OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.21 (0.092)* 0.07 (0.055)
Xt  Xt1 0.19 (0.059)** 0.03 (0.036)
Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.07) 0.05 (0.039)
Xt+2  Xt 0.08 (0.102) 0.08 (0.068)
Xt+3  Xt 0.09 (0.124) 0.1 (0.104)
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Table 27 (continued )
Cobb Douglas productivity growth TFP (Log LP estimate)
OLS Matching OLS Matching
Xt+1  Xt 0.03 (0.017) 0 (0.018) Xt+1  Xt 0.01 (0.004) 0 (0.004)
Xt+2  Xt 0.09 (0.03)** 0.02 (0.029) Xt+2  Xt 0.02 (0.006)* 0.01 (0.006)*
Xt+3  Xt 0.11 (0.041)** 0.07 (0.041) Xt+3  Xt 0.01 (0.008) 0.02 (0.009)*
Log adjusted closing price
OLS Matching
Xt  Xt2 0.05 (0.052) 0.01 (0.036)
Xt  Xt1 0.04 (0.03) 0.03 (0.021)
Xt+1  Xt 0.16 (0.034)*** 0.06 (0.023)**
Xt+2  Xt 0.21 (0.053)*** 0.1 (0.038)**
Xt+3  Xt 0.22 (0.066)*** 0.18 (0.056)**
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